[Couldn’t resist the title given last week’s major blizzard in New Jersey] Last week was a big week for decisions in criminal appeals. All three of the Supreme Court’s opinions last week, and both of last week’s published Appellate Division opinions, were in criminal cases. Here are summaries.
State v. Butler, ___ N.J. ___ (2026). This unanimous opinion by Justice Noriega involved a conviction of defendant for offenses involving controlled dangerous substances. After the Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, the Supreme Court granted review. Defendant asserted a number of alleged trial errors. The Court held that each of those were harmless errors, but ruled that “the cumulative effect of the identified errors deprived Butler of his right to a fair trial.” The Court therefore reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and ordered a new trial.
State v. Gilliano, ___ N.J. ___ (2026). This was an unusual case, in which the Supreme Court issued an order disposing of the appeal on January 21, 2026, with an opinion to follow. This decision, by Chief Justice Rabner for a unanimous Court, was issued just over a month later. The Chief Justice’s introductory paragraphs (condensed here into one long paragraph) well summarize the nature of the appeal and the Court’s ruling: “On January 11, 2026, Governor Philip D. Murphy issued an executive order that granted clemency -- to the extent needed to restore the ability to qualify for jury service -- to certain individuals with a conviction of an indictable offense. Defendant’s trial was slated to start two days later, on January 13. Consistent with standard practice, prospective jurors received a jury summons and questionnaire about eight weeks earlier. In response, nine individuals reported they had a prior conviction for an indictable criminal offense, and they were excused from jury service. On the morning of trial, the parties asked the trial court to summon a new jury pool. The court denied the request, and the parties sought emergent appellate review. Because defendant could not establish that the existing jury pool violated his ‘right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community,’ State v. Dangcil, 248 N.J. 114, 140 (2021) (quoting State v. Andujar, 247 N.J. 275, 296-97 (2021)), we agreed with the trial court’s determination. We therefore issued an order on January 21 directing that defendant’s trial resume with the jury panel that had already been summoned.” The balance of opinion explained the Court’s ruling in full detail.
State v. Carlton, ___ N.J. ___ (2026). Justice Noriega wrote this opinion, another unanimous one. The issue, as he phrased it, was “whether an enhanced sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), New Jersey’s persistent offender statute, predicated on fact-finding rendered without the benefit of a jury, could be subject to harmless error review.” The Court held that such error was “subject to harmless error review and was harmless under the circumstances of this case.” But the Court observed that “as presently written, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) is inconsistent with the principles announced in Erlinger.” The Court thus called on the Legislature “to revise this provision to comport with Erlinger’s mandate.”
State v. Lebron, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (2026). Defendant was convicted of murder and other offenses arising out of the death of his former girlfriend, the mother of his children. As Judge Gummer explained in her opinion for the Appellate Division, “[d]efendant claims the trial court erred by admitting into evidence hearsay statements of the victim under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the rule against hearsay, N.J.R.E. 804(b)(9).” The Appellate Division “reject[ed] his argument because, as a matter of first impression, [the panel] agree[d] with the courts of other jurisdictions that it need not be shown under this hearsay exception that rendering the witness unavailable was the sole reason for the defendant’s conduct.” Defendant’s other arguments also failed, leading to an affirmance of his convictions.
State v. Millner, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2026). This opinion by Judge Smith involved two back-to-back appeals. Defendants had been convicted of sexual offenses in other jurisdictions and were required to register as sex offenders there. Each moved to New Jersey without notifying the other jurisdiction and were arrested on separate charges. It was then discovered that they were sex offenders who had failed to register as such in New Jersey, for which they were each indicted, but without a predicate procedural step on which the appeals eventually turned. Each defendant moved to dismiss his indictment, but the Law Division denied those motions. The Appellate Division reversed. The panel held that “an out-of-state sex offender’s requirement to register in the state where they have been convicted does not, by operation of law, eliminate the Legislature's clear due process mandate in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(3). That mandate requires the State to find that an out-of-state sex offender’s crime is similar to a New Jersey Megan’s Law offense prior to charging that out-of-state offender with failure to register in New Jersey. If the State determines that the offender’s out-of-state crime is similar to a New Jersey Megan’s Law offense, then the offender has a right to challenge that determination in the Law Division, before being charged. See Matter of A.A., 461 N.J. Super. 385, 390 (App. Div. 2019). The out-of-state offender’s failure to notify the supervising authorities of their home state prior to relocating to New Jersey does not overcome the due process mandate established by our Legislature prior to being charged in this state.”
