C.J.S. v. A.S., 2025 N.J. Super LEXIS _______ (App. Div. Nov. 18, 2025). [Disclosure: I represented the successful plaintiff in this appeal.] The Victim's Assistance and Survivor Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-13 to -21 (“VASPA”), was enacted to protect against, among other things, cyber-harassment. Only someone “who is not eligible for a restraining order as a ‘victim of domestic violence’ as defined by . . . [the Protection of Domestic Violence Act , N.J.S.A. 2C:25:17-35 (“PDVA”]” may invoke VASPA protection.   

C.J.S. is the first husband of S.S. As today’s per curiam opinion of the Appellate Division summarized, “[p]laintiff and S.S. divorced in 2019 and have since been involved in extensive post-judgment litigation regarding their two minor children. Plaintiff alleged defendant, who was then S.S.'s boyfriend and is now her husband, sexually abused the children. Plaintiff filed an order to show cause concerning the alleged acts of abuse. On March 17, 2020, the court entered an order barring defendant ‘from any further contact with the children pending further order’ of the court. This order remains in effect to this day.”

During the ongoing litigation and appeals, C.J.S. alleged that A.S. had engaged in conduct constituting cyber-harassment and stalking under VASPA. That VASPA complaint was filed in Bergen County, where plaintiff and defendant both lived, as permitted by VASPA. That court issued a Temporary Protective Order (“TPO”) under VASPA.

Because the post-judgment litigation between C.J.S and S.S. (in which A.S. was also a party) was pending in the Essex County Family Part, having been transferred there by the Bergen County Assignment Judge on that judge’s own motion, the VASPA case was transferred there as well. The Essex Family judge, on his own motion, questioned whether jurisdiction to proceed under VASPA was lacking.

The judge “explained it would not have jurisdiction if the parties had a ‘child in common’ under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d). The court then noted, relying on D.V. v. A.H., 394 N.J. Super. 388 (Ch. Div. 2007), while plaintiff and defendant do not ‘biologically’ have children in common, ‘they [do] have . . . step-children in common.’ The court explained, while ‘child in common’ is not defined in the PDVA, plaintiff and defendant were in a ‘family-like’ setting. It ultimately found step-children fell within the meaning of a ‘child in common’ under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d). Therefore, the court concluded it had no jurisdiction over the VASPA matter, dismissed the claim, and vacated the TPO.”

C.J.S. appealed, and the Appellate Division (Marczyk and Bishop-Thompson, J.J.A.D.) reversed, applying de novo review to the statutory interpretation issue presented. The panel found D.V., the sole basis for the Family Part’s dismissal, completely inapplicable to the circumstances of this case:

“In D.V., the court addressed whether it had jurisdiction under the PDVA in a matter involving an allegation the defendant biological father of a child committed an act of domestic violence against the plaintiff, his wife's sister -in-law. The child was removed from the defendant and his wife on several occasions, and the plaintiff was granted legal and physical custody. However, the defendant was afforded parenting time. Ibid. The plaintiff subsequently filed a PDVA complaint, alleging the defendant harassed and threatened to kill her. Ibid.

The D.V. court held the parties had a ‘child in common,’ for the purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d), because they shared a ‘family-like relationship’ from being ‘judicially joined’ to share in the parenting of a child. Because the plaintiff and her husband had sole legal and physical custody of the defendant’s child while the defendant maintained parenting time rights, the court determined the parties shared a ‘child in common.’ Therefore, the court concluded it had jurisdiction under the PDVA and entered a final restraining order (FRO) against the defendant.

We conclude the trial court improperly relied on D.V. The plaintiff and the defendant there both had parental rights. The facts here are not analogous. Not only does defendant not have any parental rights, but he has also been barred from having any contact with the children for over five years. This is far afield from the ‘judicially joined’ parties involved in D.V. Under these circumstances, we determine the parties do not have a ‘child in common’ for the purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d), and plaintiff should have been permitted to proceed with his VASPA action” (citations omitted).

The court went on to say that the case belonged in Bergen County. “[Given] defendant does not ‘share a child’ with plaintiff, has no parental rights, and has been barred from any contact with the children at this juncture, … there is no reason the VASPA matter cannot be adjudicated in Bergen County, where N.J.S.A. 2C:14-14(e) and our rules provide venue is proper.” The panel reinstated the VASPA case and the TPO, and remanded the matter to Bergen County for further proceedings.