State v. Amang, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2025).  This opinion, issued today, was another magnum opus (63 pages) by Judge Susswein in a criminal case.  As stated in the first sentence of the decision, this was an appeal from defendant’s “jury trial convictions for aggravated assault, simple assault, endangering the welfare of a child, possession of an assault firearm, and possession of large capacity ammunition magazines.  Defendant committed the assault and endangering crimes against his daughters.”  The bottom line result was an affirmance of the convictions for most of the crimes, but a reversal and remand on the simple assault charges.

Judge Susswein’s lengthy and detailed opinion, which examined all the issues exhaustively under New Jersey law and cited numerous decisions from other jurisdictions, is well worth reading in full.  The following summary, borrowed piecemeal but verbatim from the opening section of the opinion, summarizes the result on two sets of charges: (1) the assault/child endangerment charges, and (2) the weapons charges:

“[Defendant] contends the trial court erred when instructing the jury on child endangerment and improperly responded to the jury’s question regarding a parent's right to use corporal punishment.  After reviewing the record in light of the governing legal principles, we reject defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the child endangerment counts and thus affirm those convictions.  However, the trial court did not adequately address the jury’s question concerning a parent’s authority to use corporal punishment in relation to simple assault, and on that basis, we reverse the simple assault convictions and remand for a new trial on those counts.

“With respect to the firearms-related convictions, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the assault rifle and large capacity ammunition magazines police found in his house while executing a consent search.  Following defendant’s arrest, police administered Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] warnings and defendant asserted his right to confer with an attorney.  Police went back to defendant while he was still in custody and asked him to consent to a search of his home.  Defendant contends that police did not scrupulously honor his prior request to consult with an attorney, rendering his consent invalid.

“Defendant’s contention raises a question of first impression under New Jersey law, requiring us to consider the interplay between the right against self-incrimination, the right to privacy in one’s home and effects, and the right to the assistance of counsel.  In considering the synergy of these distinctly enumerated constitutional rights, we are especially mindful that New Jersey law affords heightened protections with respect to each of them….

“By invoking the right to consult with counsel during the Miranda waiver colloquy, defendant signaled that he did not want to cooperate with police without first conferring with an attorney. He thus ‘sought refuge in his constitutionally-guaranteed right to deal with [] police only through counsel. State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 273 (1986).  We are unpersuaded that refuge provides sanctuary only from police efforts to secure inculpatory evidence in the form of testimonial admissions, not physical evidence, as some courts outside this jurisdiction have reasoned.  Nor are we convinced that when defendant expressed his desire to speak with an attorney, he meant only to protect his legal interests with respect to the former type of evidence.  We are skeptical that lay persons in police custody fully understand the legal distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial responses….

“[W]e conclude the approach most consistent with our jurisprudential values is to establish a simple rule that provides clear guidance to police: when a person in custody asks to speak with an attorney, police should not thereafter request the arrestee to consent to a search when there has been no break in custody.  We thus conclude the detective should not have re-approached defendant while he was still in custody to ask for consent.  Doing so rendered the consent presumptively involuntary and therefore subject to suppression.

“That conclusion does not end our inquiry, however, because there are exceptions to the general rule that evidence seized following a constitutional violation must be suppressed.  In this case, the trial court properly found that the State met its burden of proving the elements of the inevitable discovery exception by clear and convincing evidence.  We therefore affirm defendant’s weapons convictions.”

Now go and read the rest.