Palmisano v. State of New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2025). The opening paragraph of Judge Marczyk’s opinion for the Appellate Division well encapsulates what the appeal was about and what the result was. “Plaintiff Lindsay Palmisano appeals from the trial court's April 1, 2024 order dismissing her complaint with prejudice against defendant State of New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts and Municipal Division (AOC) pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). The primary issue on appeal is whether plaintiff, a municipal court administrator, is an employee of the AOC, thereby allowing her to assert a claim against the AOC under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. Based on our review of the record and the applicable legal principles, we conclude plaintiff was employed by Vernon Township (Township), not the AOC, and, therefore, we affirm.”
Plaintiff was been employed as a court administrator for the Municipal Court of the Township since 2019. She filed an LAD complaint against the AOC and defendant Municipal Court Judge James B. Sloan. Plaintiff alleged that Sloan had "made several disturbing sexist comments" and "offensive, sexist remark. Additionally, plaintiff alleged that on one occasion, while a matter was ongoing before Sloan, he came off the bench and "grabbed [plaintiff's] hair and yanked it back forcibly." Sloan was also a defendant originally, but plaintiff later stipulated to his dismissal from the case.
The AOC moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, contending that plaintiff was not employed by the AOC and therefore had no LAD claim against that office. The Law Division agreed and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Appellate Division, applying de novo review, affirmed.
Plaintiff offered a number of arguments in support of her contention that the AOC, not the Township, was her employer. Among other things, as Judge Marczyk noted, she invoked “Rule 1:33-4, which provides that assignment judges are ‘responsible for all personnel matters in municipal courts,’ and therefore, ‘the Assignment Judge has complete authority over [c]ourt [a]dministrators.’ She also argues that because court administrators are bound by the judicial canons, required to take continuing legal education courses and periodic examinations to become certified by the State, and that the AOC can remove them if they are not in good standing, it follows that they are employees of the State.” Plaintiff also relied on certain statutes in Title 2B in support of her position.
The Appellate Division disagreed with all those arguments. “The plain language of N.J.S.A. 2B:12-10(a) states a ‘municipality shall provide for an administrator and other necessary employees for municipal court and for their compensation,” Judge Marczyk observed. “Plaintiff's contention that ‘the State oversees and controls the entire process of municipalities 'establishing' their courts’ is belied by N.J.S.A. 2B:12-10(a) and 2B:12-1(a) and the absence of statutory language granting such authority to the State. More importantly, these statutes do not support the inference that ‘any employee of a municipal court is ultimately an employee of the State.’"
Plaintiff’s reliance on Rule 1:33-4 fared no better. “Rule 1:33-4(b) designates the assignment judge of each vicinage as the ‘authorized representative’ of the Chief Justice ‘for the efficient and economic management’ of courts within the vicinage, including budget, personnel, and facilities. Rule 1:33-4(c) further provides the assignment judge is ‘responsible for the supervision and efficient management of all court matters." However, these Rules do not impact the employer-employee relationship of municipal court administrators and their respective municipalities. Rather, they set forth the assignment judge's administrative and supervisory respnsibilities in overseeing the municipal court system. They do not support the conclusion that plaintiff was employed by the AOC.”
Plaintiff also relied on Thurber v. City of Burlington, 387 N.J. Super. 279 (App. Div. 2006), but Judge Marczyk found that reliance “misguided.” In that case, the Appellate Division “did not conclude that the deputy court administrator was an employee of the State. Instead, [the court” repeatedly referred to the deputy court administrator as an employee of the City and recognized the limits of an assignment judge's role and authority over municipal court personnel.”
Summing up, Judge Marczyk said that “if the Legislature intended municipal court administrators to be considered employees of the AOC, it could have expressly done so. Instead, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2B:12-10(a), specifically establishing that municipalities ‘shall provide for an administrator’ of municipal courts and pay ‘their compensation.’ Although the AOC provides oversight and supervision of municipal courts, that does not equate with the AOC establishing an employer-employee relationship with plaintiff.”
