Brehme v. Irwin, ___ N.J. ___ (2025). One might intuitively think that a plaintiff who accepts full payment of a civil judgment for damages from an auto accident including pain and suffering, disability, impairment, loss of enjoyment of life, and past lost wages, and signs a warrant to satisfy judgment cannot then an appeal a ruling on a motion in limine that barred evidence of future medical expenses. Indeed, as Justice Fasciale observed in his opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court in this case, that was essentially the rule at common law. “The long-standing general rule was that when a litigant accepts the benefit awarded . . . by a [final] judgment, that litigant is precluded from afterward challenging the validity of the conditions by an appeal” (cleaned up).

But as Justice Fasciale went on to say, in Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corp., 26 N.J. 229 (1958), the Court found the appealability issue “more nuanced.” There, a party cross-appealed a judgment after accepting it. The cross-appeal “was explicitly confined to [a] single issue” that would have increased that party’s recovery. The cross-appellant had given notice before accepting the judgment that it intended to cross-appeal “to assert that an additional sum was due.” On those facts, the Court allowed the cross-appeal to be maintained.

Based on that decision, Justice Fasciale crystallized the rule that would govern the Brehme case as follows: “when a plaintiff accepts a final judgment, that party may still appeal if the party can show that (1) it made its intention to appeal known prior to accepting payment of the final judgment and prior to executing a warrant to satisfy that judgment, and also that (2) prevailing on the appellate issue will not in any way impact the final judgment other than to potentially increase it.” But did plaintiff here meet that two-pronged test?

The Court answered “no,” affirming the Appellate Division’s decision to dismiss the appeal as moot. “As to the first prong, Brehme did not make her intention to appeal known prior to accepting payment of the final judgment and prior to executing a warrant to satisfy that judgment. She accepted payment of the final judgment, her counsel deposited the money into his trust account, and her counsel signed a warrant to satisfy judgment. Three weeks later, Brehme filed her [notice of appeal] from the final judgment.”

Plaintiff also did not satisfy the second prong. “[P]revailing on the evidentiary appellate issue -- whether a plaintiff can admit into evidence future medical expenses in a civil suit even though her PIP limits have not yet been exhausted -- would require vacating the final judgment because a claim for future medical expenses is not separable from seeking compensation for pain and suffering. Thus, even if we concluded that Brehme met prong one, she is unable to show that prevailing on the trial court evidentiary ruling will not impact the final judgment and only potentially increase it.” Justice Fasciale went on to explain that in more detail, but the bottom line was that the appeal was dismissed as moot.

State v. Reyes-Rodriguez, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2025). This opinion by Judge Rose addressed whether the Law Division properly issued a bench warrant for defendant, who had been deported to Mexico, his home country, after he was indicted on charges of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child and fourth-degree criminal sexual contact and thus did not appear in person for a pretrial hearing. He did appear remotely at that hearing and at “nearly all prior court hearings.”

Defendant moved to vacate the warrant and to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds or, alternatively, to be able to appear at all proceedings remotely from Mexico. The Law Division denied all those forms of relief, and the matter came to the Appellate Division after the Supreme Court had granted leave to appeal and summarily the matter to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division had denied leave to appeal before that, which led defendant to go to the Supreme Court.

Judge Rose first addressed the motion to dismiss the indictment, apply de novo review. Relying on State v. Lopez-Carrera, 245 N.J. 596 (2021), and the four factors of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), which were adopted in New Jersey by State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196 (1976), the panel found no basis to dismiss the indictment.

But defendant won on the issue of his non-appearance in person, as to which Judge Rose applied the abuse of discretion standard of review. Citing Lopez-Carrera, an administrative order issued by the Supreme Court titled “Order: The Future of Court Operations — Updates to In-Person and Virtual Court Events (Oct. 27, 2022), and Rule 1:2-1(b), the panel concluded that “defendant’s inability to attend court hearings in person in this matter was the direct result of his removal from the United States by immigration officials, not by his voluntary conduct,” as well as “the State's refusal to extradite him on these third- and fourth- degree charges.”

Judge Rose also observed that the panel’s holding was “consonant with defendant’s ability to waive his right to appear at trial pursuant to Rule 3:16(b). Stated another way, because defendant may waive his right to appear at trial, the court mistakenly exercised its discretion by not permitting his reasonable request to appear virtually at an otherwise in-person trial in view of his inability to legally reenter the United States and physically appear in court.”