Due to the press of other work, it’s been awhile since this blog reported on Supreme Court and published Appellate Division decisions. There are four opinions to discuss, one of which addressed two cases in a single ruling. Here are summaries:
Cowan v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., ___ N.J. ___ (2026). When a prisoner is denied parole, the Parole Board sets a Future Eligibility Term (“FET”). An FET is the period of time an inmate must remain incarcerated before being considered for parole again. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a)(1) contains criteria for a presumptive FET. This opinion by Justice Pierre-Louis, for a unanimous Court, found arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable the Parole Board’s imposition of a 200-month FET when the presumptive FET was 27 months. The Court held that “[i]n order for the Parole Board to impose an extended FET beyond the presumptive term, it must (1) overcome the presumption by explaining why the presumptive term is clearly inappropriate and (2) explain why the extended FET that the Board imposed is necessary and appropriate. Any extended FET imposed should be no longer than needed to address the likelihood of recidivism, which is the primary concern of the applicable statute and regulations.”
Hornor v. Upper Freehold Regional Bd. of Educ., ___ N.J. ___ (2026). This was the appeal where the Court’s 6-1 opinion, written by Justice Patterson, covered two different cases (the other appeal was Simpkins v. South Orange-Maplewood School District). The Court’s ruling addressed whether N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a)(1), a provision of the Child Victims Act enacted by the Legislature in 2019, authorizes the imposition of vicarious liability on a school district for a teacher’s sexual abuse of a student outside the scope of the teacher’s employment. The Court held that the statute is not an absolute bar to vicarious liability, and that plaintiffs’ vicarious liability claims should not have been dismissed at the pleading stage in the circumstances of these cases. Justice Fasciale dissented, stating that he would have held that public school districts may be vicariously liable for their employees’ tortious sexual acts only in certain circumstances when such acts are committed within the scope of their employment. He would have allowed Simpkins to proceed but not Hornor.
S.G. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corrections, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2026). The introductory paragraphs of Judge Chase’s opinion in this case (consolidated into a single paragraph here) well summarize the issue and the panel’s ruling: “Resident, S.G., who identifies as female, is civilly committed to the Special Treatment Unit (“STU”) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38.3 She appeals from the Department of Correction’s (“DOC”) January 4, 2024 final agency decision denying her request to transfer from the STU to a women’s-only correctional facility. S.G. alleges discrimination, invoking both the Law Against Discrimination ("LAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to 14.1, and the Equal Protection Clause. She asserts gender-based indignities, claims to have suffered harassment, and argues the DOC failed in its duty to protect her dignity and identity. Careful review of the record, in light of the legislative intent and established principles, yields the following: The DOC is bound by law to house sexually violent predators separately from inmates serving criminal sentences and designates the STU as the sole treatment facility for all adjudicated SVPs. This classification is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. It serves the statutory purpose—protection of society and provision of treatment. The LAD prohibits exclusion and indignity yet does not compel sex-segregated facilities for civilly committed persons. The Equal Protection Clause is not offended where legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons govern placement. The record shows S.G. is not denied equal dignity, nor uniquely burdened on account of her gender identity. Thus, we affirm the DOC final agency decision.”
State v. Harris, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2026). This opinion by Judge Berdote Byrne called on the Appellate Division “to determine whether three allegedly incorrect dates contained in a certification in lieu of oath, submitted pursuant to Rule 1:4-4(b) that rendered the subsequently issued search warrants stale, should have been corrected by the motion court as typographical errors to defeat a motion to suppress evidence, or whether an evidentiary hearing should have taken place to determine whether the dates in the certification were erroneous.” The Law Division declined to treat the incorrect dates as mere typographical errors. On the State’s appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed. “[T] he issuing judge had no basis to issue the warrants because nothing contained within the four corners of the certification indicated the dates were typographical errors. On its face, the certification did not demonstrate probable cause to search because it was based on stale information. Also, only information presented to the issuing judge may be considered by a reviewing court. The State is barred from introducing extrinsic evidence beyond the four corners of the warrant application.”
