Though the Appellate Division’s two-week recess means no oral arguments, that court has not been dormant. In the week just ending, the first of the two recess weeks, the Appellate Division issued three published opinions. Here are summaries:

New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. D.P.-Z., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2026). This opinion by Judge Perez Friscia today decided an unusually complex abuse and neglect case. Here is how Judge Perez Friscia summarized the circumstances and the panel’s ruling:

“Appellant Mil.Z. (Mary) appeals from the April 30, 2024 Family Part order denying her a Title 9, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.73, abuse or neglect hearing after she, as the child subjected to the alleged abuse or neglect, objected to the trial court's acceptance of the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency’s (Division) settlement with defendants D.P.-Z. (Dawn) and S.E.Z (Sara) to an ‘established’ abuse or neglect finding pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). Mary also appeals from the trial court’s companion order denying her a plenary hearing on sibling visitation and best interests evaluations. The Law Guardian for Mary’s siblings, Ma.Z. (Maya) and Mi.Z. (Mindy), urges us to reject Mary's arguments and affirm the court's orders.

We hold the trial court was permitted to accept the Division's Title 9 settlement with Dawn and Sara over Mary’s objection, but we reverse and remand for further proceedings because the court failed to make sufficient factual findings regarding Dawn’s and Sara’s stipulated abuse or neglect. Further, we conclude the court improperly denied Mary’s request for sibling visitation under the Child Placement Bill of Rights Act (CPBRA), N.J.S.A. 9:6b-1 to -6, and the Siblings Bill of Rights (SBR), L. 2023, c. 1, §§ 1-3 (codified at N.J.S.A. 9:6B-2.1 to -2.2 and amending N.J.S.A. 9:6B-4). Mary had the presumptive right to sibling visitation under the CPBRA and the SBR and made a prima facie showing of resulting harm from the denial of visitation to her and her two siblings. Therefore, the court improvidently disregarded Mary's request and the Division’s multiple recommendations for sibling visitation, failed to adequately address Mary’s presumptive right to sibling visitation, and should have ordered best interests evaluations to address visitation. For these reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.”

Gonzalez v. Township of West Windsor, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2026). This was a municipal land use appeal. Plaintiffs challenged a new zoning ordinance that facilitated a 5,000,000-square-foot commercial/industrial project as well as site plan and subdivision approval that the Township’s Planning Board granted for that development. The Law Division held that plaintiffs’ attacks on the ordinance were time-barred and that the Board’s grant of the approvals was not arbitrary and capricious. In a lengthy and detailed opinion by Judge Smith, the Appellate Division affirmed in all respects.

S.M.T. v. S.A., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2026). Judge Berdote Byrne’s opinion in this case addressed the parties’ respective appeals from the denial of their requests for final restraining orders against each other. Here is how the judge encapsulated her ruling:

“S.M.T. alleged a series of incidents of physical abuse, forced sexual acts, and coercive control during the parties' marriage, culminating in an altercation on May 31, 2024. Although the trial court concluded S.A. committed the predicate act of simple assault and recognized a prior incident of simple assault by S.A. against S.M.T., it did not make specific findings with respect to the sexual assault allegations or coercive control, and ultimately denied S.M.T. an FRO. The court reasoned the proven incidents of physical assault amounted to ‘marital contretemps’ for which an FRO was not necessary to protect S.M.T. from future harm because any risk could be

handled in the existing family dissolution matter. We disagree and conclude S.M.T. demonstrated the need for an FRO because she proved simple assault, sexual assault, and coercive control, and established the likelihood of a risk of continued domestic violence. A pending dissolution matter is not the appropriate forum to address future risk of domestic violence, unless the parties have mutually agreed to civil restraints. We reverse the trial court’s order and remand for the entry of an FRO in favor of S.M.T. against S.A., consistent with this opinion.

However, we find no reason to disturb the trial court’s determination that S.A. failed to prove S.M.T. committed a predicate act of domestic violence and affirm the denial of an FRO in his favor.”