January, So Far
State v. Payne, ___ N.J. ___ (2025). This opinion by Justice Wainer Apter for a unanimous Court addressed whether the Law Division abused its discretion in denying defendant’s petition for release under the Compassionate Release Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e. The Law Division found that defendant had satisfied the Act’s medical and public safety requirements, but held that her crimes involved “particularly heinous, cruel, or depraved conduct” and therefore satisfied the first “extraordinary aggravating factor” stated in State v. A.M., 252 N.J. 432 (2023). The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the facts here were “often present in first-degree murder cases” and thus were not “extraordinary.” The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the Law Division’s ruling, agreeing that defendant’s actions were extraordinarily heinous, cruel, and depraved, such that that conduct outweighed mitigating factors that may otherwise point in favor of compassionate release.
257-261 20th Avenue Realty, LLC v. Roberto, ___ N.J. ___ (2025). This was another unanimous decision (5-0, with Justice Pierre-Louis not participating). The issue was whether the version of the Tax Sale Law, N.J.S.A. 54:5-1 et seq. (“TSL”), that was in effect before being amended in 2024 and therefore governed this case, was unconstitutional. The constitutional claim, based on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, was that the TSL unlawfully took from a property owner in foreclosure the surplus value of the owner’s equity in the subject property without just compensation. As Chief Justice Rabner recounted, the Law Division vacated the foreclosure judgment in this case under Rule 4:50-1(f), not reaching the constitutional issue. While that ruling was on appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631 (2023), which held that a property owner in similar circumstances had adequately alleged a Takings Clause violation. The Appellate Division affirmed the ruling of the Law Division under Rule 4:50-1(f) and also found the TSL unconstitutional based on Tyler. The Supreme Court affirmed that decision, as modified to the extent that it relied on Tyler and the violation of the Takings Clause. The Court did not adopt Rule 4:50-1(f) as a basis for its ruling.
Anselmi & DeCicco, Inc. v. J. Fletcher Creamer & Son, Inc., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2025). This was a public bidding case. Judge Gilson authored the panel’s opinion. The Passaic Valley Water Commission (“the Commission”) awarded to defendant Creamer a contract to construct two large concrete tanks at the Levine Reservoir in Paterson. That site was listed on the National Register of Historic Places, and the bid solicitation thus required that the work be monitored by a qualified Registered Archaeologist. Creamer, Plaintiff (“Anselmi”) and another defendant, Carbro Constructor Corp. (“Carbro”), as well as other bidders not relevant to the appeal, all listed Registered Archaeologists in their bids, but only Carbro’s was registered under the Public Works Contractor Registration Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.48 et seq. (“the PWCR Act”). Carbro challenged the bids of both Anselmi and Creamer on that basis, but the Commission rejected Carbro’s argument and also found that the bid of Anselmi, the lowest bidder contained a material defect that disqualified Anselmi. The Commission awarded the project to Creamer. Anselmi sued Creamer, the Commission, and Carbro. The trial court upheld the award to Creamer and rejected the contentions of Anselmi and Carbro. Only Carbro appealed. Applying the deferential standard of review applicable to bidding appeals, while evaluating legal issues de novo, Judge Gilson held that because Creamer’s archaeologist would not be performing ‘public work’ as defined by the Prevailing Wage Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.25 et seq., the archaeologist was not required to be registered under the PWCR Act.
Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Medical Care, P.C., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2025). This was another opinion by Judge Gilson. Like his ruling in Anselmi, above, the case required harmonization of multiple statutes, as Judge Gilson recognized at the start of his opinion. “The issue presented is whether claims of insurance fraud under the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (the Fraud Act), N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1 to -30, and the New Jersey Anti-Racketeering Act (RICO), N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 to -6.2, are subject to arbitration under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1 to -35. The resolution of that issue involves discerning and harmonizing the Legislature’s intent in enacting the Fraud Act, RICO, AICRA, and the arbitration system set up under AICRA for the resolution of disputes concerning personal injury protection (PIP) benefits.” The panel held that insurance fraud claims under the Fraud Act and RICO are not subject to PIP arbitration under AICRA, reversing a contrary Law Division ruling that had dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint in favor of arbitration and allowing plaintiffs to proceed in court with a right to a jury trial.
State v. Seligman, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2025). This matter, involving possession of the drug Ecstasy with intent to distribute, was the only criminal case among the published opinions so far in 2025. As often seems to be the case in complex criminal appeals, the panel’s decision was written by Judge Susswein. The key issue on appeal was defendant’s motion to suppress evidence revealed by a search because, even though there was a warrant whose validity defendant did not contest, police officers failed to comply with Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2015-1, which requires activation of their body worn cameras in a timely manner. The Law Division rejected that argument and the Appellate Division affirmed, declining “to create a new rule of law whereby evidence is suppressed when an officer violates the … Directive while executing a knock-and-announce search warrant.”
Berkoski v. Honda Motor Co., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2025). This case was one of this blog’s Appellate Division argument of the week in October 2024. It resulted in yet another opinion by Judge Gilson, who has had a busy January. As Judge Gilson often does, he summarized the issue and its resolution concisely at the start of his opinion. “This appeal presents the question of whether a motor vehicle is defectively designed because it does not include the latest driver-assistance technologies even though not mandated by federal or state law. Plaintiff contends that a 2016 Honda CR-V was defectively designed because it was not equipped with a lane departure warning (LDW) system and a lane keeping assist (LKA) system. We hold that the absence of those available driver-assistance systems, in a vehicle that was otherwise safe and fit for driving, did not, as a matter of law, establish that the 2016 Honda CR-V was defectively designed within the meaning of the New Jersey Products Liability Act (the PL Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 to -11.” Accordingly, the panel affirmed the summary judgment that the Law Division had granted to the Honda defendants.