Pine Ridge Realty Associates, LLC v. A.O., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2026). One might think that there are no novel legal issues in landlord-tenant law. Today’s opinion by Judge Bishop-Thompson shows the error of that belief.

Defendants A.O. and L.O. rented an apartment from plaintiff in February 2023. When rent had not been paid for January and February 2024, plaintiff filed an action for possession of the apartment. After that complaint was filed, L.O. moved out of the apartment due to alleged domestic violence by A.O.

As Judge Bishop-Thompson recounted, “L.O. remained in the apartment. A default judgment for possession was entered against L.O. only and a warrant of removal was subsequently executed. A.O. paid the outstanding rent to Pine Ridge and a consent to surrender the property to the landlord was subsequently signed by the parties on February 29, 2024. The handwritten notation at the bottom of the form stated: ‘[Pine Ridge] has agreed that [A.O.] may apply to the court to have [the] records . . . shielded from public view pursuant to [Rule] 1[:]38[-11](b).’”

Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) permits the sealing of landlord-tenant case records under two circumstances: “(i) adjudicated or otherwise disposed of landlord tenant cases in which no judgment for possession ever has been entered; and (ii) landlord tenant cases in which judgment for possession was entered seven years ago or longer.” The novel issue in today’s case, as Judge Bishop-Thompson phrased it, was “Does a consent order to surrender property to a landlord constitute a judgment for possession in landlord-tenant cases under our governing law? The answer to this question determines whether such a consent order remains a public record for seven years.”

That answer was important to L.O. In a motion she filed to vacate the default judgment for possession against L.O and seal the record of that judgment from public view under Rules 1:38 and 4:50-1. A.O alleged that she was unable to find new housing. because the judgment for possession against L.O. appeared on background checks conducted by prospective landlords, who then declined to rent to her.

The trial court denied A.O.’s motion and directed the entry of a case notice stating that the default judgment for possession ran against L.O. only. That court said that “Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) was dispositive, explaining records of landlord-tenant cases in which a judgment for possession has been entered cannot be sealed unless seven years have passed from the date of the judgment.”

A.O. appealed. Judge Bishop-Thompson stated that the de novo standard of review and principles of interpretation of statutes applied to the interpretation of the Court Rules involved, and that the abuse of discretion standard governed the denial of the motion to seal.

A.O. did not have standing to vacate the default judgment of possession against L.O. under Rule 4:50-1 because she was not “a party or the party's legal representative” under that Rule. But A.O. prevailed nonetheless.

That was because, as Judge Bishop-Thompson explained, “[t]he court entered a default judgment against only L.O., pursuant to Rule 6:6-3. There was no default, trial, or decision on the merits as to A.O. Instead, A.O. and Pine Ridge reached an agreement by consenting to the surrender of the apartment and the sealing of the record. Further, the consent order to surrender property does not contain the operative language of the model form contained in our court rules, namely: ‘consent judgment’ and ‘[t]he [t]enant . . . agrees to immediate entry of a [j]udgment for [p]ossession.’ Consent to Enter Judgment (Tenant Vacates), Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix XI-W, at 2134 (2026).”

“The consent order to surrender the property is, both in nature and effect under our governing law, fundamentally different from a judgment for possession, and therefore does not trigger any of the court rules applicable to the entry of a judgment for possession.” The trial court misapplied its discretion because there was no judgment for possession. The panel ruled that the consent order to surrender property was subject to the sealing requirement under Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) and is shielded from public view, and directed the trial court to enter an order sealing the record.