Paciorkowski v. Jetson Electric Bikes LLC, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2026). Plaintiff, an attorney, filed a putative class action for consumer fraud and on other theories against defendant He alleged that he had purchased three electric bikes from defendant, that the bikes had several problems that made them essentially unusable by adults, and that New Jersey law effectively made the bikes illegal to use in New Jersey.
After plaintiff obtained entry of default, he filed a motion for class certification and for judgment in his favor. The Law Division held that plaintiff lacked standing to pursue any claim since he had “suffered no personal injury from the product.” Plaintiff appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Judge Gilson’s opinion focused first on standing, as that affected plaintiff’s ability to bring any claim. Addressing plaintiff’s claim under the Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 et seq. (“CFA”), to begin with, Judge Gilson observed that “[a] plaintiff can bring a claim under the [CFA] if he or she ‘suffers any ascertainable loss of moneys or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of any method, act, or practice declared unlawful under [the CFA].’ N.J.S.A. 56:8-19. An ascertainable loss is one that is ‘quantifiable or measurable.’ [Citations]. An out-of-pocket loss or a loss in value of the product received relative to what was promised is sufficient to establish damage” under the CFA.
Plaintiff had ascertainable loss since he “purchased three Jetson bikes for just under $700. He alleges that those bikes are defective and unusable and, therefore, he has asserted losses of approximately $700.” More specifically, he alleged that “defendant (1) misrepresented the [bikes’] weight capacity; (2) falsely stated that the bike tires were made of rubber when they were made of nylon[, which plaintiff alleged was inferior to rubber]; (3) falsely stated that the [bikes] were made of aluminum when they were made from steel or iron[, which, unlike aluminum, could rust]; and (4) sold bikes that are illegal to use in New Jersey.”
Judge Gilson then turned to the Law Division’s rationale that plaintiff lacked standing because he did not allege personal injury. “Personal injury is not a requirement for standing under the [CFA]. See N.J.S.A. 56:8-19. Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court has clarified that the [CFA] only allows the recovery of economic damage and does not permit the recovery of non-economic damages. [Citations].” Nor did plaintiff need to allege personal injury in order to pursue his other theories. Judge Gilson cited a number of cases for that principle.
Plaintiff was thus able to pursue all his claims. But the second principle that Judge Gilson reiterated disabled plaintiff from doing so on behalf of a class. That principle was that “plaintiff cannot serve both as the class representative and counsel for the class.”
Like the first principle about the lack of any personal injury requirement, the second principle was not new. It dated back “[o]ver forty years ago, [w]hen the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a general rule prohibiting a lawyer from serving in the dual capacities of class representative and attorney for the class” in In re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action, 93 N.J. 412 (1983). That general rule was subject to only one exception for certain public interest litigation, which did not apply here.
Plaintiff argued that certain subsequent developments, including an amendment to Rule 4:32-2, one of the class action rules, rendered the Cadillac principle no longer effective. Judge Gilson did not agree. No case has questioned that principle, and the panel “interpret[ed] that silence as acceptance of the well-established rule and its continued validity.”
Accordingly, the Appellate Division reversed the decision below in part and “remand[ed] with direction that the individual claims be reinstated and plaintiff be permitted to pursue those claims.” But the panel affirmed the denial of class certification “on the alternative grounds that plaintiff cannot serve in the dual role as class representative and class counsel.”
