It’s time to catch up with the courts again. Last week, the Supreme Court issued two opinions, while the Appellate Division published one decision. Here are summaries:
In re Hoffman, ___ N.J. ___ (2025). This case involved the appropriate discipline for a Judge of the Municipal Court, R. Douglas Hoffman (not to be confused with Judge Richard Hoffman of the Appellate Division). Though the opinion provides much more detail, Chief Justice Rabner’s opinion, for a unanimous Court, summarized the key facts in a single sentence. “Our review of the record reveals that Respondent invited a subordinate court employee (“A.A.”) to his summer home, provided beer and shots of hard liquor that the two drank liberally over the course of several hours, discussed intimate details of the employee’s sexual relationship with her boyfriend, and then touched her in a sexually suggestive manner without her consent.”
After the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (“ACJC”) conducted a testimonial hearing, which resulted in a recommendation to the Supreme Court that respondent be removed from judicial office for violating three provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the matter came to the Supreme Court. There, “1) Respondent ‘acknowledge[d], and for the purpose of this proceeding [would] not challenge the findings of fact and misconduct contained in the [Advisory’s Presentment; (2) ‘he acknowledge[d] the ACJC’s recommendation for removal’; (3) he ‘[would] not object to the Court’s ability to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, on the existing record that there is cause for removal in conformity with N.J.S.A. 2B:2A-9’; and (4) he ‘[would] not challenge the standard of proof or object to the Court’s ability to find beyond a reasonable doubt that there is cause for removal on the established record.’” However, Hoffman did not admit “to touching A.A. ‘in a sexually suggestive manner.’”
The Supreme Court found Hoffman guilty of violating Code of Judicial Conduct Canons 1, Rule 1.1, for failing to “personally observe[] high standards of conduct,” Canon 2, Rule 2.1, because he did not act in a manner to “promote[] public confidence in the . . . judiciary” and “avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety,” and Canon 5, Rule 5.1(A), because he did not “conduct [his] extrajudicial activities” in a way to avoid “demean[ing his] judicial office.’” The question then became what level of discipline should be administered.
In arguing for a suspension rather than removal from the bench, Hoffman cited cases that “date back a decade or more,” Chief Justice Rabner noted. More recent cases involving offensive sexual touching or sexual assault, however, resulted in removal. Because municipal judges, like other jurists, receive mandatory training as to preventing sexual harassment and must certify annually that they have reviewed the judiciary’s anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies, “egregious” conduct such as that of Hoffman “will result in removal from office and not a period of suspension.” It did not help that Hoffman “has not expressed remorse or contrition. And his demeanor at the hearing, as the ACJC noted, was flippant, defiant, and disrespectful of the disciplinary process.”
Estate of Spill v. Markovitz, ___ N.J. ___ (2025). Justice Noriega wrote this opinion for a unanimous Court in this medical malpractice matter that was before the Court on leave to appeal. The issue, he said, was one “of first impression: whether a jury may allocate fault to an out-of-state alleged tortfeasor who is not subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey.” That required an analysis that addressed both the Comparative Negligence Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 et seq. (“CNA”), and the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-1 et seq. (“JTCL”).
Applying de novo review, Justice Noriega noted that the plain language of the two statutes differs. “[T]he CNA allows allocation of fault during a trial only to a ‘party’ or ‘parties,’ N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(a), whereas the JTCL allows ‘joint tortfeasors’ to seek contribution after a trial from other ‘persons’ alleged to be ‘liable in tort for the same injury,’ N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-1, -3.” He therefore held that the non-party alleged tortfeasor doctor over whom there was no jurisdiction “is not a ‘party’ subject to allocation by the jury pursuant to the CNA.” But that was not the result under the JTCL, given its differing language. “Accordingly, if a judgment is rendered in this matter against defendants, they may pursue any available contribution claims in a jurisdiction relevant to any additional alleged tortfeasors.”
State v. Canales, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2025). This opinion by Judge Vanek reversed a ruling of the Law Division that had dismissed an indictment under the doctrine of fundamental fairness, thereby preventing a third trial of defendant for sexual assault, endangering the welfare of a child, and criminal sexual contact relating to three girls under the age of thirteen and one adult female in separate incidents. The first trial ended with a hung jury, and a conviction in the second trial was vacated and remanded for a new trial due to an evidentiary error. Judge Vanek noted that the doctrine of fundamental fairness, derived from State v. Abbati, 99 N.J. 418 (1985), is applied only “sparingly.” The panel held that the Law Division had mistakenly exercised its discretion in dismissing the indictment. “The State’s substantial evidence and differing proofs on retrial post-remand, coupled with the interests of the victims, their families, and the public in prosecuting the multi-count indictment for an alleged spree of sex offenses, primarily against minors, merit[ed] reversal.”