Murder Trial Judge Inadequately Addressed Juror Misconduct, Requiring Remand to Determine Whether Jury Was Tainted

State v. Byrd, ___ N.J. ___ (2025). Justice Noriega authored the Court’s unanimous opinion in this case today. During the murder trial that led to this appeal, allegations of misconduct by a certain juror, No. 8, surfaced. That juror allegedly conducted outside research, discussed the case with third parties, texted one of the defendants, and expressed an intent to find defendants guilty. The trial judge questioned Juror No. 8, but on appeal from defendants’ convictions, which the Appellate Division had affirmed, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s inquiry “was insufficiently tailored to the allegations against the juror, failed to probe into the heart of the allegations, and was therefore inadequate.” The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Justice Noriega stated that the standard of review was abuse of discretion. He emphasized that “[w]hen the trial court becomes aware of allegations of juror misconduct, bias, or external influence, it must determine, first, whether the allegations are sufficiently plausible to warrant further inquiry. If so, then the court must assess whether any affected jurors are capable of fulfilling their duty to judge the facts in an impartial and unbiased manner, based strictly on the evidence presented in court.” That inquiry is not to be conducted “begrudgingly,” but through “searching and probing questions to uncover the specific nature of the extraneous information and safeguard the jury’s impartiality.”

Though the trial judge did not make an explicit finding of the plausibility of the allegations, Justice Noriega concluded that the judge had implicitly made such a finding and that it was appropriate. The question then became whether the judge had “engage[d] in a scrupulous investigation into the situation, with deliberate questions designed to uncover potential prejudice in order to preserve the overall fairness of the proceedings.”

The Court found that the trial judge had made two errors. First, the judge’s questioning of Juror No. 8 occurred “at sidebar in the presence of the jury.” But “[w] hen a trial court conducts an inquiry into potential jury misconduct by voir dire of a single juror, it must do so in open court and outside the presence of the remaining jurors,” Justice Noriega said, citing a prior Supreme Court case. That “ensures transparency and allows both parties to participate meaningfully, thereby preserving the defendant’s right to due process…., [and] protects the integrity of the jury as a deliberative body by minimizing the risk that other jurors will be influenced -- consciously or unconsciously -- by either the allegations or the inquiry itself.”

Second, the trial judge’s questioning “fell short” of the required “probing and independent inquiry.” Though the juror had allegedly been Googling, the judge asked the juror only “’And in terms of any posting or newspaper articles, is there anything outside of what’s been in this courtroom that you have been in contact with?’ That question, by its phrasing, narrowly focused on exposure to passive media sources – ‘posting[s] or newspaper articles’ -- and failed to ask the more direct and necessary question: whether the juror herself had actively conducted any internet research about the case.”

Justice Noriega then continued. “More broadly, the court’s inquiry centered on whether Juror No. 8 had received outside information, but did not explore whether she had sought it out, discussed the case with others, or engaged in any conduct that might suggest a lack of impartiality.

The court’s last question also failed to address the core allegation of pre-determination. The court asked: ‘And you believe that you can listen to the evidence in this case, and as I have asked you certainly throughout the voir dire process, listen to the evidence, apply the law as I give it to you at the end of the case and render a fair and impartial verdict?’ While this question reaffirms the juror’s understanding of her duty to remain impartial, it does not reach the critical issue of whether the juror engaged in conduct inconsistent with that duty. The proper inquiry is not whether the juror believes herself to be impartial, but whether the trial court can satisfy itself as to the integrity of the proceedings by an objective determination of impartiality based on the juror’s answers to probing, fact-specific questions.”

The incompleteness of the trial court’s questioning left unresolved whether the juror improperly influenced or shared prejudicial information with her fellow jurors. That uncertainty, Justice Noriega aid, “strikes at the heart of the defendants’ constitutional right to an impartial jury” and required a remand to determine “whether juror taint occurred and, if so, whether further steps, including a new trial, are necessary.”

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