In the recent period, the Supreme Court issued one opinion and the Appellate Division published four decisions. Here are summaries:
State v. Hannah, ___ N.J. ___ (2026). This unanimous opinion by Justice Pierre-Louis was from a conviction for murder and unlawful possession of a weapon. The issue, as the Justice phrased it, was “whether a lay witness can testify regarding cell site location information (CSLI) -- specifically, the locations of cell towers that cell phones connect to -- or whether an expert witness is required to provide such testimony.” A Detective Sergeant, who had not qualified as an expert, had provided testimony that was used to connect defendant to the crime. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that it was improper to accept lay testimony regarding CSLI. The Supreme Court affirmed in a detailed opinion. Although the Court had not considered this particular issue, it had recently ruled, in State v. Burney, 255 N.J. 1 (2023), that expert CSLI testimony that a defendant’s cell phone was likely near a crime scene was an inadmissible net opinion because it lacked factual evidence or objective data. That ruling, and decisions from other jurisdictions, which were somewhat split, influenced the result in this case.
In re Expungement of the Criminal/Juvenile Records of R.G.C., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2026). Judge Bishop- Thompson, who authored the panel’s opinion in this case, well summarized the matter in the opening paragraph of her opinion. “In this appeal of first impression, we must determine the meaning of ‘willful noncompliance’ in the ‘clean slate’ statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(c), which permits an expungement of a New Jersey criminal record if ten years have passed ‘from the date of the [petitioner’s] most recent conviction,’ N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(b), when restitution has not been fully made. The motion court denied petitioner’s second petition for expungement without prejudice after determining her failure to pay restitution upon release from prison constituted willful noncompliance. Petitioner contends her application should have been granted because more than ten years have passed since her release and her failure to satisfy the restitution obligation was not willful. Absent competent and credible evidence of petitioner’s inability to satisfy her restitution obligation, we conclude her failure to pay was a deliberate act made in conscious violation or disregard of the civil judgment, and affirm.”
In re State of New Jersey and Council of New Jersey State College Locals, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2026). This was a labor case, in which Chief Judge Sumners wrote the panel’s opinion. The Public Employment Relations Commission (“PERC”) ruled that 28 employees of three state colleges could be members of a union because their job duties did not satisfy the “managerial executive exception” of the Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-3. That exception excludes from union membership “persons who formulate management policies and practices” and have “the responsibility of directing the effectuation of such management policies and practices.” Applying the arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable that governs appeals from administrative agency actions, Chief Judge Sumners found no impropriety in PERC’s ruling.
McGuinniss v. Ski Campgaw Management LLC, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2026). This opinion by Judge Berdote Byrne posed “he novel question of whether the Ski Act, N.J.S.A. 5:13-1 to -11, applies to snow tubing.” The Law Division had denied a defense motion for summary judgment, holding that the Ski Act did not apply. The Appellate Division reversed. Judge Berdote Byrne reviewed the history of the Ski Act and noted that it weas intended to protect ski area operators from liability and to cabin their insurance costs. The ultimate issue was whether a snow tuber fell within the statutory definition of “skier,” which covered “a person utilizing the ski area for recreational purposes such as skiing or operating toboggans, sleds or similar vehicles, and including anyone accompanying the person.” N.J.S.A. 5:13-2(c) (emphasis by Judge Berdote Byrne). The panel concluded that snow tubes were among the “similar vehicles” covered by the Ski Act “because they are used for a snow-based recreational activity, as are toboggans, skis, and sleds. The term ‘similar vehicle’ in N.J.S.A. 5:13-2(a) to (c) is preceded by other winter activities—skiing (alpine or touring), tobogganing, sledding, and operating skimobiles—all of which involve sliding across snow-covered terrain and are subject to the same variables as traditional skiing and its attendant risks, including surface issues, ice, pitch, ruts, speed congestion, run outs, and weather. Snow tubing fits comfortably into this class of activities.”
In re Estate of Samuel P. Hekemian, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2026). As Judge Rose, who wrote this opinion, stated, this appeal involved, “as a matter of first impression, the validity of an arbitration provision contained in a testamentary instrument.” The Chancery Division denied a motion to compel arbitration. The Appellate Division affirmed, but for somewhat different reasons. Invoking de novo review, Judge Rose held that the demand for arbitration failed “for lack of mutual consent to the arbitral forum,” but also because it was “contrary to this State's statutory scheme governing the Administration of Estates of Decedents and Others Act, N.J.S.A. 3B:1-1 to :29-1 (Probate Code).”
