While this blog was on an early August break, the Supreme Court was busy, issuing five opinions. Here are summaries:

Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm’n v. George Harms Construction Co., Inc., 258 N.J. 286 (2024). This was a 5-0 decision written by Justice Wainer Apter. Justices Pierre-Louis and Fasciale did not participate. The question presented, as Justice Wainer Apter phrased it, was “whether the Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission, a bi-state entity created through an interstate compact between New Jersey and Pennsylvania, may require potential bidders to use project labor agreements as part of its public bidding process.” Applying de novo review, the Court concluded that, “under the plain terms of the interstate compact, it may.” That ruling reversed the decision of the two courts below. After finding that the case was not moot even thought he bridge construction project that gave rise to it had been completed, the Court held that the compact gave broad authority to the Commission and did not bar project labor agreements. Therefore, there was no basis for courts to look to the state law of New Jersey or Pennsylvania, as the Appellate Division, which had relied on a test from Ballinger v. Delaware River Port Authority, 172 N.J. 586 (2002), did.

Keyworth v. CareOne at Madison Avenue, 258 N.J. 359 (2024). This appeal involved two different cases, which arose out of injuries sustained by residents at skilled nursing or assisted living facilities. Plaintiffs in each case sought discovery, but defendants asserted that the self-critical analysis privilege contained in the Patient Safety Act, N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25 (“PSA”), precluded production. The Law Division judges in both cases rejected the privilege claims, but the Appellate Division reversed in an opinion reported at 476 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 2023). Justice Pierre-Louis, in a unanimous opinion, relied extensively on Brugaletta v. Garcia, 234 N.J. 225, 247 (2018), which had addressed the PSA’s self-critical analysis privilege. That case stated that the applicability of the PSA privilege depends on “whether the [health care facility] performed its self-critical analysis in procedural compliance with N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(b) and its implementing regulations.” One of those regulations required that a facility’s patient safety committee function independently of any other committee. That was not so at the two defendant facilities, so the privilege was unavailable.

In the Matter of Proposed Construction of Compressor Station (CS327), 258 N.J. 312 (2024). As described here, this was a case of pure statutory interpretation. The question was whether, in the phrase “routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or systems” contained in the Highlands Act, N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11), “routine” modified only “maintenance and operations” or the entirety of what followed. The Appellate Division, applying the statutory interpretation canon of noscitur a sociis, held that “routine” modified “upgrade.” The Supreme Court, however, in a 6-0 opinion by Justice Noriega (Justice Fasciale did not participate), reversed. “The Legislature’s sentence structure, use of punctuation, and word choice make use of this canon of interpretation unnecessary. The activities in [the statutory provision at issue] are designed to distinguish two distinct circumstances: (1) those that are ‘routine,’ as signaled by the conjunctive phrase ‘maintenance and operations,’ and (2) those that are responsive to triggering events, which follow a comma and include the disjunctive ‘or.’ By their very nature, ‘maintenance and operations’ are activities that would both inherently occur on a periodic or ‘routine’ basis,” while, ‘[c]onversely, [the statute’s] remaining activities all would occur on an as-needed basis after a triggering event, making them distinct from ‘routine maintenance and operations.’”

Sparta Bd. of Educ. v. M.N., 258 N.J. 333 (2024). This appeal arose out of the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The issue was whether M.N., a student with disabilities who had been at Sparta High School but then withdrew, received a state-issued diploma after having passed the General Education Development (“GED”) test, and sought to re-enroll in Sparta High School, could receive a free education at that school. Sparta denied the student’s request. Under a federal regulation, a person who receives a “regular high school diploma” is ineligible for a free public education. After M.N. sought recourse from the Department of Education (“DOE”), an Administrative Law Judge, the DOE Commissioner, and the Appellate Division all agreed with Sparta’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous opinion by Justice Wainer Apter. The Court held that a state-issued diploma based on passage of the GED is not a “regular high school diploma.” Justice Wainer Apter distinguished between State-endorsed diplomas (those issued by local education authorities signifying completion of high school graduation requirements), which bar a further free education, and State-issued diplomas (which are issued by the DOE Commissioner and do not require students to complete the same graduation requirements as State-endorsed diplomas), which do not bar further free education. The GED diploma, a State-issued diploma under the governing statutory and regulatory scheme, fell into the latter category.

State v. Zingis, ___ N.J. ___ (2024). This was the only criminal appeal decided in the recent period. It is a sequel to State v. Cassidy, 235 N.J. 482 (2018), discussed here. That case dealt with the fallout from the pervasive misconduct of then-Sergeant Marc Dennis. Dennis improperly conducted calibration checks of Alcotest machines, which are “used to determine whether a driver’s blood alcohol content is above the legal limit.” As a result of his misconduct, over 20,000 Alcotest results were placed in question. Zingis was convicted of DWI, which the Appellate Division affirmed, though that court vacated the sentence. Zingis went to the Supreme Court, which granted certification and assigned a Special Adjudicator to evaluate two issues: (1) which counties were affected by Dennis’s wrongful conduct, and (2) what notice was given to defendants who were affected by that wrongful conduct. Justice Noriega’s opinion largely agreed with the findings of the Special Adjudicator’s 370-page report, which was attached as an appendix to the Supreme Court’s ruling. However, the Court outlined a new procedure for challenging convictions potentially affected by Dennis’s actions. The result for Zingis was an affirmance of the Appellate Division as to vacating the sentence, and a remand for further proceedings under the procedure announced by the Supreme Court.