To bring things current, this post summarizes three published Appellate Division opinions that were issued in the recent period. The subject matter of these ruling ranged from construing a Court Rule about reconsideration to applying the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (“PDVA”) to determining whether the Attorney General’s office was required to defend and indemnify a Deputy Chief Assistant Prosecutor facing an attorney disciplinary proceeding that arose out of his official duties.

Doglio v. Boasso America Corp., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2026). Writing for the Appellate Division in this CEPA case, Judge Berdote Byrne stated the issues as “whether the Rules of Court permit a trial court to sua sponte vacate its order denying reconsideration of a final order granting summary judgment pursuant to Rule 4:49-2.” She noted that there had been, and continues to be, much confusion “regarding the applicability of Rule 4:42-2, which governs reconsideration of interlocutory orders, and Rule 4:49-2, which controls reconsideration of final orders.” Seeking to “reduce this confusion,” Judge Berdote Byrne discussed the two Rules and held that “[b]ecause the order in question was final, Rule 4:49-2 controls. We conclude neither plaintiff, by motion, nor the trial court, on its own initiative, was permitted by Rule 4:49-2 to vacate the [prior] order denying reconsideration to plaintiff. The denial of a motion for reconsideration does not create a new final judgment that is itself subject to a successive motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 4:49-2.” A different principle, expressed in Rule 4:42-2, that allows reconsideration of interlocutory orders at any time, was inapplicable in this final order context.

G.G.S. v. A.C.B., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2026). This was a PDVA case in which plaintiff sought a final restraining order (“FRO”) against defendant, who had committed date rape and tried to strangle plaintiff in the process. As Judge Susswin’s opinion stated, the Family Part found that “there was a dating relationship, that defendant committed the predicate act of sexual assault, and that he placed his hands on plaintiff's neck four or five times, affecting her breathing. The court described the violent episode as ‘despicable.’” Despite all that, however, the Family Part vacated a temporary restraining order and denied the requested FRO because, Judge Susswein said, “plaintiff had not demonstrated that an FRO was necessary to protect her from ‘immediate danger. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on the lack of a previous history of domestic violence between the parties.” On the horrific facts of this case, the panel found that the Family Part had abused its discretion and reversed and remanded for entry of a TRO. “Although a plaintiff seeking an FRO under the PDVA must establish the need for protection from further abuse, the foreseeable abuse need not be imminent and the risk of it coming to fruition should be assessed in the context of considering the victim's best interests.”

Dirkin v. Office of the Attorney General, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2026). Judge Smith wrote the Appellate Division’s opinion in this appeal, which asked the court to “consider for the first time whether the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) is obligated to exercise its statutory discretion under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to :14-4, to defend and to indemnify an assistant county prosecutor who is the subject of an attorney disciplinary proceeding stemming from the performance of their official duties.” Plaintiff argued that both the TCA and common law imposed on the OAG a duty to defend and indemnify him against the disciplinary action brought against him by the Office of Attorney Ethics (“OAE”). The Appellate Division disagreed, affirming the final administrative decision of the OAG. “The mandatory defense and indemnification provisions under N.J.S.A. 59:10-1 and :10A-1 do not cover disciplinary actions filed by the OAE. The Attorney General did not abuse its discretion in denying representation under N.J.S.A. 59:10A-3, as the ethics complaint frames Dirkin's actions in terms of willful misconduct. The common law doctrine of respondeat superior requires a tort claim, which we do not find here. Finally, we decline to impose a common law duty on the Attorney General under these circumstances.”