Continuing to catch up with our appellate courts’ activities in the final three weeks of January, this post addresses two new grants of certification by the Supreme Court. One is a case under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act and the other is a criminal appeal.
The Tort Claims Act case is Wilson v. City of Newark. The question presented, as phrased by the Supreme Court Clerk’s office, is “Under the circumstances presented, was the City of Newark entitled to immunity under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, given that N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 requires that signs be posted on, and at the last safe exit or detour preceding, a railroad bridge or overpass with less than 14 feet 6 inches of clearance, and was plaintiff required to present expert testimony in support of his contention that the City acted palpably unreasonably?” The Law Division denied the City’s motions for summary judgment and for directed verdicts. A jury then awarded plaintiff $562,500 in damages. The Appellate Division, in an unpublished per curiam opinion by a three-judge panel, vacated the jury verdict and ordered entry of judgment for the City and dismissal of the case. [Disclosure: My firm, Lite DePalma Greenberg & Afanador, LLC, represents the City of Newark in some cases but did not do so in this case].
The criminal appeal is State v. Matos, in which defendant was convicted of sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child. The question presented there is “Did the lack of a jury instruction about the purpose of fresh complaint testimony constitute plain error, was evidence about prior uncharged bad acts that occurred in New York admissible, did the prosecutor’s comments during opening and closing statements improperly bolster the victim’s testimony and inflame the jury, and did those alleged errors individually or cumulatively amount to reversible error?” A three-judge panel of the Appellate Division, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, affirmed the convictions, rejecting all of defendant’s arguments. The panel did, however, vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
