Due to a confluence of factors, the most recent post on this blog was in the first week of January. This post, and others to follow, will catch up with the activities of our appellate courts for the rest of January.
The Supreme Court issued opinions in five cases during that window. All were unanimous. Here are summaries:
In the Matter of Petition for Rulemaking to Amend N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11, ___ N.J. ___ (2026). This matter arose out of a petition filed by the Office of the Public Defender seeking rulemaking before the New Jersey State Parole Board that would alter N.J.A.C. 10A:71-2.2. The Public Defender asserted that that regulation wrongly prevent inmates seeking parole from accessing their own medical, psychiatric, and psychological records even though the Parole Board can review and consider such records. The Board denied the petition and the Appellate Division affirmed that decision. But in an opinion by Chief Justice Rabner that applied de novo review, the Supreme Court held that the regulation “runs contrary to established due process protections.” The Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded to the Parole Board to adopt a new regulation “consistent with the rulemaking process.” Integral to the Court’s ruling was Thompson v. State Parole Board, 210 N.J. Super. 107 (App. Div. 1986).
Christakos v. Boyadjis, ___ N.J. ___ (2026). This opinion by Justice Wainer Apter involved “the appropriate standard for when an attorney owes a duty of care to a non-client such that the non-client can bring an action for legal malpractice.” The Court adopted the standard contained in section 51 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. Justice Wainer Apter noted that the Court had employed the tests of that section in certain prior cases, but had “not always clearly articulated the test” that should apply in this context. Her opinion thus for the first time expressly adopted section 51. But plaintiff did not meet the standards of that Restatement section. Accordingly, applying de novo review, the Court affirmed the summary judgment against her.
Arias v. County of Bergen, ___ N.J. ___ (2026). Plaintiff was injured while she was rollerblading in Van Saun Park, a 130-acre park in Bergen County. She sued the County, which moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The County asserted that it had immunity from suit under the Landowner Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-2 to -10 (“LLA”). The Law Division granted dismissal and the Appellate Division affirmed in an opinion reported at 479 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 2024). On further review, the Supreme Court affirmed as well. Writing for the Court, Justice Hoffman said that the LLA was a “’liberally construed . . . inducement’ for landowners to open ‘their property for sport and recreational activities’ without ‘fear of liability.’” N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-5.1. Because rollerblading was a type of “recreational activity” contemplated by the Legislature, and the park was “the type of open and expansive ‘premises,’” covered by the statute, the County had immunity under the LLA.
C.A.L. v. State of New Jersey, ___ N.J. ___ (2026). The introductory paragraphs of Justice Wainer Apter’s opinion in this case well summarize the opinion that followed:
“Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), provides that when a plaintiff’s civil rights claim necessarily impugns the validity of a criminal proceeding, the claim does not accrue until the criminal proceeding has been terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. This case requires us to determine whether that rule applies to claims brought under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (CRA) and the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA).
We hold that the rule applies to civil rights claims brought under the CRA, or the CRA and TCA jointly, just as it does to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We therefore hold that Counts One, Two, and Three of plaintiffs’ complaint were timely filed because the claims accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run, on June 1, 2020. The same is not true for Count Four.
We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Division.”
In the Matter of Rutgers v. AFSCME Local 888, ___ N.J. ___ (2026). Justice Fasciale wrote the Court’s opinion in this case. The issue, as he phrased it, was “whether the grievance procedure in a collective negotiation agreement (CNA) between Rutgers University and Local Union No. 888 conflicts with -- and is therefore preempted by – federal regulations promulgated in 2020 by the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) pursuant to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 203 U.S.C. §§ 1681 to 1689.” The Court held that “the CNA’s grievance procedure conflicts with the Title IX Regulations because 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b) mandates that any grievance procedures beyond those specified in that section ‘must apply equally to both” the alleged victim and the alleged harasser, but the CNA’s arbitration process excludes the alleged victim.” That conflict meant that the Title IX regulations preempted the arbitration process contained in the CNA. The Court reversed the contrary final agency decision of the Public Employment Relations Commission and the Appellate Division’s opinion that had affirmed the agency’s ruling.
