State v. Cromedy, ___ N.J. ___ (2025). The Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), prescribes a minimum term of incarceration for firearm-related offenses under certain subsections of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5, as well as a mandatory period of parole ineligibility. In this case, the issue was whether a weapons offense conviction of violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j) is covered by the Graves Act. The Law Division and the Appellate Division each held that it was. The Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous opinion by Justice Noriega.

This decision came down to fundamental principles of statutory interpretation, including that “[w]hen interpreting a statute, the Legislature’s intent is paramount to a court’s analysis, and the plain language of the statute is crucial to determining legislative intent.” In considering the issue presented, Justice Noriega applied de novo review.

The Court first quoted the relevant language of the weapons statute. “N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 governs the unlawful possession of weapons in New Jersey. Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (f) define crimes based on the type of weapon -- i.e., machine guns, handguns, rifles and shotguns, and assault firearms, respectively -- and their designated degree of severity. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(a), (b), (c), (f). Subsection (j) establishes that “[a] violation of subsection a., b., c. or f. of this section by a person who has a prior conviction of any of the crimes enumerated in NERA [the No Early Release Act] is a first degree crime.”

Justice Noriega then turned to the Graves Act. “As relevant to this case, the Graves Act provides that ‘[a] person who has been convicted under . . . subsection a., b., c., or f. of N.J.S.[A.] 2C:39-5 . . . shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or 42 months, whichever is greater . . . , during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.”

The Legislature evidently recognized the connection between N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 and the Graves Act. Justice Noriega observed that “[i]n 2013, the Legislature simultaneously amended the unlawful possession of weapons statute and the Graves Act. It added subsection (j) to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5. L. 2013, c. 113, § 1. It also added N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(f) to the Graves Act. Id. § 2. The Legislature did not add subsection (j) to the list of offenses subject to, or expressly exempt from, the Graves Act” (footnote omitted).

There were several statutory indicators that the Graves Act parole ineligibility does not apply to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j). The Graves Act, Justice Noriega said, “mandates a period of parole ineligibility for certain enumerated offenses, including subsections (a), (b), (c), or (f) of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5, as well as N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a), (b)(2), or (b)(3) (prohibiting certain persons from possessing weapons). The Graves Act does not mention N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j), and therefore a sentence under that provision does not carry the Graves Act’s mandatory period of parole ineligibility.”

Justice Noriega emphasized that “if the Legislature had intended for subsection (j) to trigger the Graves Act’s mandatory minimums and parole ineligibility periods, it could have included that provision expressly in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), as it did with other subsections. That it did not do so -- especially when simultaneously amending the statutes to create subsection (j) and broadening the reach of the Graves Act -- is a legislative choice, and not one the courts are free to override under the guise of avoiding an allegedly undesirable or unexpected outcome.”

Subsections (h) and (i) of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5, adjacent to subsection (j), reinforced the Court’s conclusion. “Subsection (h) provides that ‘[a] person who is convicted of a crime under subsection a., b., f. or j. of this section shall be ineligible for participation in any program of intensive supervision.’ N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(h). Subsection (i) provides that ‘[a] person convicted of violating subsection a., b. or f.’ must be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and may face the imposition of a minimum period of parole ineligibility if certain aggravating factors apply. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(i).” In contrast, subsection (j) did not mention ineligibility for parole or other program of intensive supervision.

Justice Noriega’s extensive and detailed analysis of the issue went well beyond the foregoing and is well worth reading in full. The Court also prescribed, from a practical perspective, how trial courts should handle subsection (j) cases going forward. “The State must present the elements of subsection (j) to a jury and prove them beyond a reasonable doubt. However, because the existence of a prior NERA conviction is a necessary element of the first-degree charge, but also a prejudicial fact if introduced prematurely, trial courts must conduct a bifurcated trial, severing proceedings for subsection (j) from prior proceedings for the possessory charge. Mirroring the proceedings used in cases of a certain persons offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7, trial courts may use the same jury that has rendered a guilty verdict on the underlying N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 weapons offense to hear evidence in the subsequent trial on the first-degree subsection (j) offense.”